Long Term Capital ManagementJan 9th, 2010 | By Andrew Matuszak | Category: Finance Theory
I've been reading number of articles recently about Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). LTCM was a hedge fund run by John Meriwether out of Greenwich, CT. Meriwether assembled some of the best minds in the field of finance theory: Scholes, Merton, etc. It was both a stunning success (1995, 1996, and 1997) as well as an epic failure (1998). Many writers have been using LTCM as another example of finance academics and wall street investors running out-of-control. I do not think that this is the case. In fact, I think an important accomplishment has been tarnished–the creation and subsequent implementation of a revolutionary risk management tool.
Fisher Black, Myron Scholes, and Robert Merton created the perfect formula. It is perfect, not because it is infallible but because it pushed the frontiers in finance and ushered in a new era of risk management. The frontier of science is not a clean and orderly place. Failure proceeds success and success is defined, if at all, in shades of grey. History often takes time to write the winners and the true success of an accomplishment may be much different in nature than originally envisioned.
For all of the disorder and ugly preceding failure, the human race needs to push the frontiers in order to continue to sustain and grow our standard of living. Black, Scholes, and Merton—as well as Meriwether and the other Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) partners and investors—pushed finance to new places and we as a society are better for it.
Unfortunately, the world is not often appreciative of it pioneers.
The epic implosion of LTCM was surely disruptive. At the very least, it cost several investors a substantial amount of money and put the global financial system under pressure. The press and politicians saw the opportunity to attack. (It is interesting just how few politicians and press actually understood what they so fearlessly and courageously lambasted—after the fact.) Congressional committees were hastily convened. Several books were published. The average American could be forgiven for condemning the ‘failed wizards of wall street’.
But the truth of the matter was that their discovery (the Black-Scholes model for pricing options) provided a vast new set of tools for investors—and if used prudently, could enable investors to effectively manage the systemic risks of their positions. Building on the work of Louis Bachelier at the turn of the 20th century, LTCM provided a real-world laboratory so that the ideas could be tested under real market conditions. The first three years yielded enormous profits and demonstrated the potential under general market conditions. After raising three billion in three months the firm returned 20% net (after management fees) in year 1, 43% in year 2, and 41% in year 3. But in 1998 there were a series of events that were unanticipated: the Asian crises and the Russian sovereign debt default. These events were outside the data built into distributions used by LTCM.
In the end, the models were vindicated (the spreads on their opposing positions eventually converged), but it was too late. The counter-parties to LTCM required higher-and-higher margins, positions were called, and leverage squeezed to astronomical heights. LTCM was effectively bailed out by a consortium of banks at the height of the liquidity crises. (The banks all made their money back—in effect proving the strategy.)
The failure of LTCM proved an effective market signal. It was capitalism at work, providing a real check on the upper bounds of the financial theory (at least for now) and set the rules for traders. Capitalism has two sides: success and creative destruction. We cannot take only the upside benefits—we must accept that the cost of our economy’s success is that periodic failures will serve as guideposts. In this case, the lesson was that although modern financial theory predicated on probability analysis and statistics can help to manage risks it does not completely remove the element of human judgment. Financial markets continue to be subject to both rational investment valuation and human subjectivity. Black, Scholes, and Merton made important discoveries about the former. LTCM did not manage to remove the latter.
For me, the point is that models work the vast majority of the time. To expect perfection is unrealistic. According to Peter Fisher, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “models don’t drive financial markets”. Since there is still an element of human subjectivity and judgment, we can expect the occasional model mishap since models rely on inputs and a rational, functioning market. Financial modeling is no different than other technologies. We accept the occasional failure in other technologies because we understand occasional failure is a by-product of operating in the real world. Product defects are real and we are typically happy if the defect rate can be effectively minimized—but not eliminated. Perhaps because of the mathematical formulas, the public expects too much of our financial engineers. With time and public education, we can come to see the benefits of the models while appreciating their limits.
We have been given the opportunity to benefit from the discoveries of Black, Scholes, and Merton—among other economists. By applying these important risk management tools in a prudent manner we can significantly reduce our risks. By appreciating the inherent limitations of financial modeling we can apply judgment and intuition. There is room for both science and intuition in our financial markets and we would do well to appreciate the limitations and shortcomings of both.